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CASENOTES
investigation into legislative intent. The dissent, on the other hand,
considered the statute too indefinite and reached its conclusion strictly
on the basis of construction of an ambiguous tax statute. The majority
relied heavily on the case of State ex rel. Tampa Electric Co. v. Gay"
in which the facts were similar to those of the instant case. There the
court held that the taxpayer's rights were barred by the time limitation
set forth in the same statute with which we are here concerned. The
dissent in the instant case dismisses the Tampa Electric case by pointing
out that in that decision the right of the taxpayer grew out of the judicial
construction of a valid statute, and not from the determination that the
taxing statute was unconstitutional. The dissent relies upon Walgreen
Drug Store Co. v. Lee'" and what it considers the obvious intent of the
lawmaking body.
It appears that the taxpayer was dealt with rather harshly in the
instant case. It does not seem logical that the legislature, having
envisaged a situation such as this, would have intended the right to refund
to accrue as of the date of payment, but rather when the statute was
declared unconstitutional. Plaintiff paid the tax willingly, and thus could
not bring an action for a refund until he was given statutory authorization,
unless he brought an action to attack the constitutionality of the statute.
Is this not a harsh requirement to be imposed upon any law-abiding
citizen?
Herbert Jay Cohen.
TORT-INVASION OF RIGHT TO PRIVACY-
TELEPHONE MONITORING
Plaintiff subscriber sought to recover damages for alleged invasion
of her privacy resulting from the monitoring of her private telephone
conversations by the defendant telephone company who suspected plaintiff
was using such telephone for business purposes. Held, that no invasion
of privacy resulted since plaintiff suffered no damages, secrecy had been
maintained and there had been no publication except to her. Schmukler
.v. Ohio Bell Telephone Co., 116 N.E. 2d 819 (Ohio 1953).
The recognition of the personal right to privacy is comparatively
new in the law of torts,' and is not a subject covered by any of the
old commentators of the law. Relief in early cases was always based on
established theories of breach of confidence or trust, 2 breach of contract, 3
17. 40 So.2d 225 (Fla. 1949).
18. See note 16, supra.
I. 4 Harv. L. Rev. 193 (1890). The doctrine of the law of privacy, as such, was
first advanced in this country in an article written by Louis D. Brandeis and Samuel D.
Warren. This was the first United States comment advancing that we ought to recognize
it as a personal right and not one of property only.
2. Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902)(which led to enactment of a statutory right of privacy).
3. Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 Pac. 532 (1918).
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or invasion of one's property rights. 4 The exceptions, extent, and limita-
tions of such a right vary in the different jurisdictions. The right is
recognized by some jurisdictions as existing at common law;5 by others
as created by statute,0 and still by others as a fundamental constitutional
right.7  However, liability for the invasion of such right is determined
not by the lex fori, but by the lex loci delictus.8
The law of privacy has been applied mainly when dealing with the
unauthorized use of a person's name,0 or of a picture, 10 or of the showing
of a likeness in a motion picture," publication, 12 radio and television, 18
or a right to a private letter. 4  Some cases denied any such right at
common law,' and no action could be maintained at all upon the theory
that such a right must be created by the legislature and not by the courts.16
Today, the right is designed primarily to protect the feelings and
sensibilities of human beings, rather than to safeguard property, business,
or other pecuniary interests.' However, it protects only the ordinary
sensibilities of an individual and not supersensitiveness." Where the right
is violated, its violation is a tort' 0-the right being the compliment of
the right of immunity of one's person; not on the principle of private
property but on the principle of an individual personality.20
4. Prince Albert v. Strange, 2 De. & Sm. 652, 1 M & Cord. 45, 41 Eng. Rep.
1171 (1848) (England, though favoring a personal right of privacy now seems com-
mitted to the idea that there must be an injury to property or reputation).
5. Cason v. Baskin, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So.2d 635 (1947).
6. N.Y. CIVIL RimTs LAw, Art. 5, § 50.
7. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 Pac. (1931).
8. Banks v. King Features Syndicate, 30 F. Supp. 352 (S.D.N.Y. 1939).
9. Edison v. Edison Polyform Co., 73 N:J.Eq. 136 (Ch. 1907).
10. Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905).
11. Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, 194 F.2d 6 (10th Cir. 1952).
12. Kreiger v. Popular Publications, Inc., 168 Misc. 5, 3 N.Y.S.2d 480 (Sup.
Ct. 1938).
13. Cohen v. Marx, 94 Cal. App.2d 704, 211 P.2d 320 (1949).
14. People v. Burns, 178 App. Div, 845, 166 N.Y.S. 323 (1st Dep't 1917).
15. State v. Davis, 139 N.C. 547, 51 S.E. 897 (1905); In re Hart's Estate, 193
Misc. 884, 83 NY.S. 2d 635 (Surf. Ct. 1948) (Subject to qualification that eavesdropping
was a crime at common law); Fisher v. Murray M. Rosenberg, 175 Misc. 370, 23 N.Y.S.
2d 677 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Kline v. Robert M. McBride & Co., 170 Misc. 974, 11 N.Y.S.
2d 674 (Sup. Ct. 1939).
16. Vassar College v. Loose Wiles Biscuit Co., 197 Fed. 982 (D.C.Mo. 1912);
Corliss v. Walker, 57 Fed. 434 (C.C. Mass. 1893) (An educational institution which
is not only a corporation but a public institution has no right of privacy which will be
conserved by injunction); Atkinson v. Doherty, 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899);
Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E, 442 (1902); Henry
v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 Atl. 97 (1909).
17. Maysville Transit Co. v. Ort, 296 Ky. 524, 177 S.W.2d 369 (1944).
18. Gill v. Curtis Publishers Co., 231 P.2d 565 (Cal. 1951); Southwestern Bell
Tel. Co. v. Cook, 30 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930).
19. Reed v. Real Detective Publishing Co., 63 Ariz. 294, 162 P.2d 133 (1945);
Cason v. Baskin, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So.2d 635 (1947); Davis v. General Finance & Thrift
Corp., 80 Ga. App. 708, 57 S.E.2d 225 (1950); RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 867 (1939) defines
the right of privacy as follows: "A person who unreasonably and seriously interferes
with another's interest in' not having his affairs known to others ... is liable to the
other."
20. Robertson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (1902).
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The right of privacy as such has not been constitutionally protected
except possibly the right of one to enjoy his home against unreasonable
invasion, which includes invasion of his private papers, writings, and
belongings. 2' The right under the fcderal constitution is as broad as
the concept of reasonableness, which means that it has no fixed boundaries,
but is broad or narrow as facts and circumstances vary.22  The Federal
Communcations Act of 1934 imposes a civil as well as a criminal liability
upon anyone who publishes an intercepted message.23
The instant case seems to be a case of first impression involving
monitoring or tapping of a telephone by the telephone company itself.
Although it has been held that the tapping of telephone wires and listening
to private conversations constitutes an invasion of the right of privacy, 24
and there are cases involving intrusion of such right by eavesdropping by
person or by mechanical means, nevertheless, such intrusion has always
been committed by some party other than the telephone company.25
The court held that plaintiff's right to privacy had not been violated
because the defendant had the right to prescribe rules and regulations
to govern the furnishing of its services or the use of its facilities, and
that the monitoring employed was the only means the defendant bad
available to detect the fraud being perpetrated upon it by the plaintiff.
Also that the rules and regulations were reasonable, 26 were not against
public policy,27 and did not conflict or interfere with the public duties of
the defendant company,28 and that the very nature of the service under-
taken exacts control by the company to assure its efficiency. 29  The com-
pany can require compliance with such rules by its patrons as a condition
of serving or continuing to serve them,80 and the subscriber is bound by
21. U.S. CONST. Art. IV, "The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated . . ."
22. United States v. Baxter, 89 F. Supp. 732, 744 (E.D. Tenn. 1950); McGovern
v. Van Riper, 140 N.J.Eq. 34, 45 A.2d 842 (Ct. Err. & App. 1946); Fernicolav v.
Keenan, 136 N.J.Eq. 9, 39 A.2d 851 (Ch. 1944); Pine v. Okzewski, 112 N.J.Eq. 429, 170
At]. 825 (Ct. Err. & App. 1934).
23. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937); Reitmeister v. Reitmeister,
162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1934): "Whoever . . . shall,
without authority and without the knowledge and consent of the users . . . tap any
telegraph or telephone line would thereby commit a Federal offense."
24. Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931).
25. Ibid.
26. Wolverton v. Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co., 58 Colo. 58, 142 Pac. 165
914); Kelly v. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., 248 S.V. 658 (Com. App. Tex. 1923);
illis v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 61 Vt. 461, 17 At. 736 (1889).
27. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Beach, 86 Ga. App. 720, 70 S.E. 137 (1911).
28. Central Union Tel. Co. v. Swoveland, 14 Ind. App. 341, 42 N.E. 1035 (1896).
29. Huffman v. Marcy Mutual Tel. Co., 143 Iowa 590, 121 N.W. 1033 (1909).
30. McDaniel v. Faubush Tel. Co., 32 Ky. 572, 106 S.W. 825 (1908); Bess v.
Citizens' Tel. Co., 315 Mo. 1056, 287 S.W. 466 (1926); Gardner v. Providence Tel.
Co., 23 R.I. 262, 49 Atl. 1004 (1901).
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such lawful rules and regulations. 31 The defendant may make a classifica-
tion of the telephone into business and residential and may charge a
different fee as to each class. 32
The court upheld defendant's contention that since its service is a
quasi-public one, 33 that it was under a duty to serve the public impartially
and without discrimination, and that if the plainiff was allowed to con-
tinue her fraud it would result in discrimination. Plaintiff would then be
paying less for the type of service used than others who practiced no
such fraud. Where use of a private branch exchange of a corporation
for a personal business was expressly prohibited, a person entitled to use
the exchange for corporate business is not entitled to recover for a denial
of personal use.34
The court also found that there was no publication of
the conversations overheard, the conduct of the plaintiff was
unethical and she suffered no real damage except perhaps from mental
anguish as a result of being frustrated in her attempt to acquire for
herself a more attractive telephone rate. It is submitted that perhaps
the court erred in this case because the court apparently was influenced
more by the unethical conduct of the defendant than by her substantive
right to privacy. The court should not have looked for special damages,
for it is not necessary that they should have occurred in order to entitle
plaintiff to recover.35  One whose right of privacy has been invaded is
entitled to recover substantial damages although the only damages suffered
resulted from mental anguish.3  The fact that the damages may be
difficult to ascertain or cannot be measured by a pecuniary standard is not
a valid reason for denying any recovery at all.37  The unethical conduct
of plaintiff is immaterial for the truth of the matter is not involved in
such a violation of privacy.38 Neither are the motives of the defendant
material with respect to the determination whether there is a right of
action."" It makes no difference that defendant did not communicate
31. Bartlett v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 62 Me. 209 (1873) (dictum that
knowledge of a rule is sufficient to bind a patron, consent not being required); Western
Union Telegraph Co. v. Ned, 86 Tex. 368, 25 S.W. 15 (1894).
32. Cumberland Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Hartley, 127 Tenn. 187, 154 S.W. 531 (1913).
33. Southern Bell Tel. & 'I el. Co. v. Beach, 86 Ga. App. 720, 70 S.E. 137 (1911).
34. McGrew v. Nebraska Tel. Co., 109 Neb. 264, 190 N.W. 783 (1922).
35. McDaniel v. Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 60 Ga. App. 92, 2 S.E.2d 810
(1939) (classic example of the violation of a person's right of privacy, wherein de,
fendant tape recorded plaintiff's conservations); Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v.
\ andergriff, 52 Ga. App. 662, 184 S.E. 452 (1936).
36. Brents v. Morgan, 221 Ky. 763, 299 S.W. 967 (1927).
37. Continental Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 86 N. E.2d 306 (1949);
Ilinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 113 P.2d 438 (1941).
38. Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291 (1942).
39. Sidis v. F. R. Publishing Co., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 711 (1940); Lewis v. Physicians and Dentists Credit Bureau, 27 Wash.2d 267,
177 P.2d 896 (1947).
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to anyone else the conversations overheard,40 for the intrusion had already
been committed. Even a suspected criminal's privacy is protected by a
requirement that a court order be procured before his telephone con-
versation may be monitored, 41 and many states have a law against
tapping into a telephone conversation. 42  In our present society which
is becoming extraordinarily complex, there is a great need for the doctrine
of the right of privacy.
.. . invasion of one's privacy is repugnant to all Americans. Even
if properly controlled it is an intolerable instrument of tyranny,
impinges on the liberty of the people and should not be
sanctioned.43
Plaintiff should have recovered at least nominal damages.
Meyer M. Brilliant.
40. Rhodes v. Graham, 238 Ky. 225, 37 S.W.2d 46 (1931) (. . . it is the
legal right of every man to enjoy social and business relations with his friends, neiqhbors,
and acquaintances, and he is entitled to converse with them without molestation by
intrusion . . .
41. N.Y. CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, § 813(a).
42. Ala Ark., Colo., Conn., Ill., Iowa, Kan., Ky., Mass., Neb., N.M., N.C.
43. Herbert Brownell, Jr., 39 CORNELL L.Q. 2 (Winter 1954).
